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Abstract: This paper provides an economic analysis of the competition effects of 
UEFA’s financial fair play regulations. It concludes that the restrictive effects of the 
break-even rule cannot be justified by a legitimate objective defense (according to 
European competition policy) because significant financial problems due to overin-
vestment are not inherent to European football. 
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1. Introduction 
Professional sports – and European-style football1 in particular – is a serious commer-
cial business with considerable turnovers and revenues. As a consequence, powerful 
market participants experience incentives to reap supracompetitive rents by restrict-
ing the beneficial forces of competition at the expense of customers or suppliers. At 
first sight, however, such powerful or dominant players do not seem to exist in pro-
fessional sports. In contrast to ordinary goods markets, professional sports requires 
the existence of a sufficient number of competitors in order to produce the product 
at all (Rottenberg 1956; Neale 1964): a monopoly football club would obviously not 
be able to provide a marketable good. Thus, there is typically no worry of single-club 
dominance in this sense. However, sports competition also requires the definition, 
implementation and enforcement of sporting rules. This is typically the role of sports 
associations who govern and regulate the sports competition. Sports associations 
usually are private companies (sometimes non-for-profit companies) and, in football, 
membership associations with the members being lower-level sports associations 
and, at the bottom of the pyramid, the clubs who provide football teams on all levels. 
For instance, the UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) consists of national 
# Prof. Dr. Oliver Budzinski, Professor of Economic Theory, Institute of Economics, Ilmenau University 
of Technology, Email: oliver.budzinski@tu-ilmenau.de. I thank Ina Fredersdorf, Nadine Neute and 
Stefanie Riemer for valuable editorial assistance. 
1 Throughout this paper, the term football will refer to European-style football (sometimes also la-
beled soccer) – and not to American football. 
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football associations as members such as the DFB (Deutscher Fußball-Bund; Ger-
many), the FA (The Football Association; England) or the RFEF (Real Federación 
Española de Fútbol; Spain). The national associations then consist of regional 
associations and the regional associations have all the clubs playing football within 
their region as members – including professional clubs as well as grassroots clubs. 
Along this pyramidal structure, all these football associations enjoy a monopoly 
position within their region. The resulting market power is rather modest on the 
bottom levels of the pyramid since being a member of the higher level association 
implies the duty to stay in line with the higher level associations while, at the same 
time, the influence on the higher level association is often rather limited due to the 
large number of voting members. Furthermore, the lowest level associations usually 
do not govern a professional league; instead, they are dealing with amateur and 
grassroots leagues and competitions. The market power on the top level of the 
pyramid, however, is significant since this is the level where the most valuable 
competitions take place (the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League) 
and a large number of member associations imply substantial scope for independent 
action. While it may be debatable how independent from the national associations 
UEFA can act, it appears to be rather obvious that the influence of the clubs 
participating in UEFA’s competitions is rather indirect – either through the chain of 
associations along the pyramidal structure or through lobbyism.2 
In summary, it does not seem to be far-stretched to ascribe a significantly powerful 
position to UEFA. In economic terms, UEFA is a market-internal regulatory agency 
enjoying a monopoly position. Now, how are the activities of a sports association 
relevant to the professional sports market, i.e. to the commercial side of sports? 
Firstly, UEFA (like most associations governing commercialized sports competitions) 
engages not only in setting and enforcing sporting rules, but also in commercial ac-
tivities, namely the bundling and sale of broadcasting rights for the UEFA competi-
tions as well as the marketing of the brands of these competitions. Secondly, the 
setting and enforcing of sporting rules itself entails a business element that is difficult 
to disentangle. Sporting rules may well be shaped with the purpose of increasing the 
attractiveness of sports and, thus, turnovers and revenues. And, sporting rules may 
well be shaped with the effect of reducing competition intensity in order to reap 
supracompetitive rents from customers or suppliers.3 Therefore, rule-making activi-
ties by UEFA constitute a commercial strategy by a dominant entity – and, as such, 
scrutiny regarding the effects on competition is justified. 
Consequently, the so-called financial fair play regulations (FFP) implemented by UEFA 
may raise competition concerns since they regulate the investment behavior of clubs 
2 Budzinski & Szymanski (2014) provide a discussion whether UEFA may be viewed as a horizontal 
cartel of football clubs or an independent player with a monopoly position in the market for compe-
tition organizing services, representing a bottleneck along the vertical supply chain of professional 
football.  
3 Consequently, the European Court of Justice ruled in its landmark Meca-Medina case that sporting 
rules are subject to competition policy and must comply with competition law. See Case C-519/04P, 
Meca Medina v. Commission, ECR 2006, I-6991. 
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participating in UEFA club competitions – an intervention that appears to be poten-
tially restrictive from the outset on. And, indeed, in 2013, the Belgium player agent 
Daniel Striani launched a complaint with the European Commission as well as a pro-
ceeding at the European Court of Justice against FFP (inter alia) on competition law 
grounds.4 According to the sports-specific competition policy practices of the Euro-
pean Commission (following the Meca-Medina judgment of the European Court of 
Justice), rules enacted by sports associations do not violate European competition 
law if 
(a) they pursue legitimate objectives (legitimacy), 
(b) their restrictive effects are inherent to these objectives (inherence), and 
(c) proportional to the benefits (proportionality).5 
In this paper, I argue from a competition economics perspective that UEFA’s financial 
fair play regulations in its current shape violate the principles of inherence and pro-
portionality and, thus, deserve a critical review by competition policy authorities. Af-
ter summarizing the main features as well as outlining the possible anticompetitive 
effects of FFP (section 2), I review the three principles legitimacy, inherence and pro-
portionality against the background of economic theory (section 3). Eventually, I re-
flect upon the results including possible alternatives (section 4). Sticking to an eco-
nomic analysis, neither do I dwell upon legal questions and theories, nor do I predict 
outcomes of legal procedures. Instead, I provide hints about an economic assessment 
of FFP within the current competition policy framework in Europe. 
2. Possible Restrictive Effects of Financial Fair Play 
The UEFA (2012, 2014) introduced FFP in September 2009 as a part of revised licens-
ing regulations, coming into full force with the 2013/2014 season.6 Every club that 
wants to enter one of UEFA club competitions (UEFA Champions League and UEFA 
Europa League) must obtain an UEFA license (next to the sporting qualification via 
the national leagues) and, thus, comply with the financial fair play regulations. 
The FFP regulations consist, in substance, of two rules: 
- the no overdue payables rule: overdue payables are understood to be all out-
standing payments (towards employees, social and tax authorities or other 
clubs) that have not been paid by the contractually agreed deadline, and 
4  See http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/latest-news/legal-challenge-to-uefa-ffp-rules-by-bosman-
lawyer and http://www.financialfairplay.co.uk/latest-news/further-legal-challenge-to-ffp-by-striani-
and-dupont (both accessed 2014-02-15, 16.38) 
5 See representing the view of the European Commission Kienapfel & Stein (2007), providing a legal 
analysis Weatherill (2006), and providing an economic analysis Budzinski (2012).   
6 See for economic-based analyses of FFP Vöpel (2011), Madden (2012), Müller et al. (2012), Peeters 
& Szymanski (2012, 2014a, 2014b), Preuss et al. (2012), Sass (2012), Franck (2013), Hamil (2014), 
Maxcy (2014), Szymanski (2014) as well as Lindholm (2010) and Long (2012) for legal sciences-based 
analyses and Könecke & Schubert (2014) for a social sciences-based analysis. 
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- the break-even rule: relevant expenses must be paid out of relevant income 
or, in other words, relevant expenses must not exceed relevant income (see 
table 1); an aggregate deviation of up to € 5 million (over three financial years) 
is acceptable. 
Violations of these rules trigger a series of sanctions, ranging from reprimands to the 
exclusion of the non-complying club from the European club competitions. 
 
Table 1: The Break-Even Rule 
Source: own compilation from UEFA (2012: 72-82) 
RELEVANT INCOME  RELEVANT EXPENSES 
- gate revenues 
- revenues from sponsorship 
and advertising 
- revenues from broadcasting 
rights 
- commercial activities reve-
nues (merchandising, food 
and beverages sales, confer-
encing, lotteries, etc.) 
- other operating income (in-
cluding non-football income 
related to the club) 
- finance income (interest reve-
nue) 
≥ 
- costs of sales and materials 
- wages and salaries (including 
related expenses such as social 
security contributions or medi-
cal care) 
- other operating expenses (e.g. 
match expenses, administra-
tion and overhead expenses) 
- finance costs and dividends 
NON-RELEVANT INCOME  NON-RELEVANT EXPENSES 
- income transactions above 
fair value7 
- donations and assumptions 
of debt by a third person 
- income from non-football op-
erations not related to the 
club 
- income from non-monetary 
credits (e.g. revaluations of 
assets and inventories) 
 
- expense transactions below 
fair value6 
- youth development 
- community development ac-
tivities (e.g. promoting partici-
pation in sports or advancing 
social development in educa-
tion, health, amateur sports, 
etc.) 
- non-monetary debits and 
charges 
- finance costs of tangible fixed 
assets 
- non-football operations not 
related to the club 
- income taxes 
7 The UEFA determines the fair value of relevant transactions according to conventional business prac-
tices. If the estimated fair value differs from the recorded value, then an adjustment must be made. 
In the case of income, however, no upward adjustment is possible, in the case of expenses, no down-
ward adjustment is possible (UEFA 2012: 75, 78). 
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While the no overdue payables rule relates to issues of payment behavior and sol-
vency, the break-even rule interferes with the investment behavior of the clubs. It 
effectively caps the investment of the competitors on the market for match playing 
services (the clubs) because it restricts the maximum expenses for the competition 
team (= relevant expenses) to the volume of the defined relevant income. As such, 
it represents a relative budget cap. This has two important implications: 
1. The cap is uneven among competitors in the sense that clubs with higher rel-
evant income are allowed to spend more than clubs with lower relevant in-
come. In this sense, FFP represents a discriminatory cap. 
2. The definition of relevant income excludes some types of sources for financing 
investment into the competition team. Notably, financial injections by so-
called benefactors (sometimes also labeled sugar daddies; e.g. Lang et al. 
2011; Franck & Lang 2012; Franck 2013) do not present relevant income and, 
thus, cannot serve to break even expenses. Somewhat simplifying, the concept 
of relevant income requires the clubs to live on their football related (earned) 
incomes and revenues. Note, however, that for a transitional period, injections 
that increase the equity of a club (injections by shareholders) increase the ac-
ceptable deviation between relevant incomes and relevant expenses. The ac-
ceptable volume is decreasing over time with the goal of diminishing it (UEFA 
2012: 36).8  
The no overdue payables rule does not appear to cause considerable restrictive ef-
fects, whereas the break-even rule comes along with several anticompetitive con-
cerns, namely (i) the salary reduction effect, (ii) the incumbent protection effect, (iii) 
the consolidation effect, and (iv) the investment security effect. 
The salary reduction effect refers to the effects of the break-even rule on the market 
for talent, i.e. the players market, as well as on the related market for consulting 
services for players (the players’ agents market). Expenses on player salaries as well 
as on transfer activities represent the dominant part of the relevant expenses of pro-
fessional football clubs. If the break-even rule caps expenses due to the limitation to 
relevant income as a source of financing expenses, then it is very likely that a down-
ward trend in players’ salaries as well as in transfer payments will result.9 The defla-
tory effect on the level of players’ salaries will cause an accompanying deflatory effect 
on the revenues of players’ agents. In summary, the investment level reduction in-
duced by FFP comes at the expense of the earning possibilities of players and players’ 
8 The starting volume is € 45 million and is reduced to € 30 million until 2018. After that “a lower 
amount as decided in due course by the UEFA Executive Committee” (UEFA 2012: 36) will come into 
force. 
9 Indeed, economic simulation models provide support for the dampening effect on player salaries 
(Peters & Szymanski 2014a, 2014b). 
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agents. Thus, rents are shifted away from these groups to the clubs and/or UEFA, 
which represents a restrictive effect towards upstream suppliers.10 
The incumbent protection effect refers to the above explained implications of the 
relative character of the cap. Basically, the break-even rule implies that clubs need to 
adjust their investment (into talent) to the level of their revenues. If a club enjoys 
high revenues, then it is able to spend accordingly. If a club suffers from low reve-
nues, then it needs to keep its expenses on a low level as well. This means that clubs 
who enjoy high revenues right now can maintain their competitive advantage by 
high investments. However, clubs who do not enjoy high revenues right now cannot 
freely invest into becoming more competitive. Instead, FFP forces them to maintain 
their lower competitive level by capping their investments. In other words, the break-
even rule frustrates catching-up investments. This favors the incumbents on the top 
level of European football who enjoy high revenues because of recent success and 
valuable brands (because of more historical success). It disadvantages clubs who are 
not on that top level yet but who want to challenge the incumbents. In summary, 
FFP cements the market structure on the top level of European football (Vöpel 2011; 
Drut & Raballand 2012; Sass 2012; Szymanski 2014) and protects the incumbents 
from new challenges by upward-pressuring upstarts, newcomers and maverick com-
petitors. Thus, the competition for participating in (and entering) the top leagues 
may be significantly impeded by FFP (creating a barrier to entry). While this restrictive 
effect is a general one, it may be particularly directed towards upstarts that are fi-
nanced by wealthy private persons (e.g. FC Chelsea, Manchester City, Paris St. Ger-
main) or by company ownership (e.g. the engagement of Red Bull) who are increas-
ingly challenging the established big clubs. Restricting these money injections may 
be particularly welfare-reducing (Madden 2012). 
The related consolidation effect refers to a decreasing volatility of changes in com-
petitive advantages and disadvantages. FFP may be viewed to be an agreement that 
clubs seeking to improve themselves must do so in a slow and measured fashion that 
is less likely to create losses but, by the same token, also is less likely to create upsets. 
As a consequence, changes in competitiveness happen slower than fans want – and 
would be willing to pay for if the investments were successful (see Coates et al. 2014 
on the importance of upsets for consumer welfare in professional sports). 
Eventually, the investment security effect points to an anticompetitive exclusion of 
entrepreneurial risk. FFP via its break-even rule is likely to lessen the risk of bad in-
vestments (e.g. into talent) since both the volume of investment and the magnitude 
of competitiveness consequences are deflated. 
In total, FFP – or the break-even rule, in particular – may lessen competition intensity 
at the expense of the fans. Negative effects on consumer welfare may arise through 
two channels. Firstly, the deflating effect on salaries and transfer payments is likely 
to lead to a reduction of the level of talent quality. Top European players looking for 
10 See the reasoning of Dupont (2013) who, as the lawyer of Striani, is advocating the antitrust com-
plaint against FFP. He views FFP to be the action of a cartel among the clubs (transmitted via the UEFA 
as an association of clubs) in order to exploit the (upstream) players’ and players’ agent markets. 
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their best earning options may decide to leave the European market and top foreign 
talent may be more reluctant to enter the European market. Since it is part of fans’ 
welfare to witness outstanding talent (economics of superstars) a reduction of talent 
quality ceteris paribus goes along with a reduction in consumer welfare – in particu-
lar if the talent reduction is not associated with a price reduction11. Secondly, the 
lower competition intensity due to the incumbent protection effect and the consoli-
dation effect may lead to decreasing competitive efforts by the clubs which harms 
the performance level. Being protected against new challengers combined with an 
ossifying effect on the relative competitiveness of the participants enables both the 
UEFA and the incumbent competitors to extract supracompetitive rents at the ex-
pense of fans12, in particular, if there are no close substitutes to premier level Euro-
pean football. 
3. Are the Restrictive Effects Defendable? 
The anticompetitive stories outlined in the preceding section show that FFP causes 
restrictive effects that have the potential to infringe either the European anti-cartel 
rules (Article 101 (1) TFEU) or the rules against an abuse of dominance (Article 102 
TFEU) – depending on whether FFP is viewed to constitute a cartel among football 
clubs organized by UEFA as an association of undertakings or UEFA is viewed to be 
a dominant undertaking (Budzinski & Szymanski 2014). However, the restrictive ef-
fects may be justified – and thus fail to infringe European competition rules – if they 
are inherent and proportional to legitimate objectives (European Commission 2007; 
Budzinski 2012). The next sections discuss whether FFP meets these three conditions 
from an economic perspective. 
3.1. Legitimacy: The Objectives of Financial Fair Play 
According to the European Commission (2007: 68), legitimate objectives are usually 
those that relate to the proper organization and conduct of competitive sport. This 
may include objectives like ensuring fair sport competitions with equal chances for 
all teams, ensuring the uncertainty of results by the absence of match-fixing, the 
protection of the athletes’ health, protecting the safety of the spectators, the en-
couragement of training of young athletes, ensuring of financial stability of sport 
clubs and teams, the rules of the game (ensuring uniform and consistent exercise of 
a given sport), etc. (European Commission 2007; Kienapfel & Stein 2007). Thus, the 
11 Since it is money from private investors that is deterred by FFP, whereas all revenue sources that are 
paid for by the fans remain unchanged (or even increase in importance since money injections from 
wealthy owners are restricted), a deflatory effect on prices (tickets, broadcasting rights, etc.) cannot 
be expected in the short run. In the midterm, however, the reduction in absolute talent quality may 
lead to a sinking willingness-to-pay, in particular for broadcasting rights. Still, this effect may well be 
mitigated by the lack of close substitutes to top level professional football. 
12 See Budzinski and Szymanski (2014) for a reasoning how UEFA itself may benefit from restricting 
access to top European leagues to the incumbent superstar clubs and from deterring new challengers. 
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financial stability of the sporting competitors is explicitly quoted as a legitimate ob-
jective. According to UEFA (2012: 2), the objectives of the financial fair play regula-
tions are  
- to improve the economic and financial capability of the clubs, increasing their 
transparency and credibility, 
- to place the necessary importance on the protection of creditors and to ensure 
that clubs settle their liabilities with players, social/tax authorities and other 
clubs punctually, 
- to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances, 
- to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues, 
- to encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football, and 
- to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football. 
These objectives appear to be comfortably in line with the Commission’s concept of 
legitimate objectives, perhaps with the only exception of the objective to encourage 
clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues. It may be debatable whether it 
represents a legitimate objective to limit the sources of financing business investment 
as long as these sources do not involve taxpayer money. Why should non-revenue 
based financial means represent an illegitimate source of financing investments? In-
creases of equity or borrowed capital do represent very usual instruments of financ-
ing investments in ‘ordinary’ business. 
Naturally, the listed objectives are the stated objectives of UEFA and in competition 
policy analyses it is common to look beyond the stated objectives because smart 
companies will obviously not state anticompetitive (or here: illegitimate) objectives 
in public. However, I do not want to speculate on UEFA’s hidden agendas here and, 
therefore, I will assume that the criterion of legitimate objective is generally ful-
filled.13 
3.2. Inherence: Systematic Market Failure in Football? 
3.2.1. Financial Crisis in Football 
From an economic perspective, the concept of inherence requires to demonstrate 
that economic competition among professional football clubs without a regulation 
of investment behavior would systematically fail. Instead, football clubs would sys-
tematically engage in irrational, irresponsible and unsustainable (over-)spending. It 
is important to emphasize that inherence requires systematic market failure and not 
just individual bad financial management of some clubs. In other words, the restric-
tive effects of FFP are inherent to the pursued objectives if otherwise the football 
13 However, see the contrary assessment by Long (2012: 91-92). 
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market would display systematic overinvestment. If unrestricted investment inevita-
bly leads to unsustainable overinvestment, then a restriction of investment behavior 
can be called inherent. 
The recent sports economics literature includes a long and controversial discussion 
about losses and debts in football (inter alia, Frick & Prinz 2006; Lago et al. 2006; 
Andreff 2007; Dietl & Franck 2007; Barajas & Rodríguez 2010, 2014; Haugen & Sol-
berg 2010; Szymanski 2010; Drut & Raballand 2012; Hamil 2014). Some of the con-
tributions as well as general press and media articles list impressive debt figures of 
single clubs and even accumulated figures for overall leagues.14 However, the inter-
pretation of these figures is often rather unclear. In particular the general media 
discussion (but also some of the more scientific treatments) often lacks a relation of 
debt figures to asset values of the football clubs, ignoring the rationale behind the 
usual business practice of working with a certain share of borrowed capital (in par-
ticular when a company or a business is growing in commercial terms – as is the 
football business). The relatively low number and frequency of insolvencies in prem-
ier level football leagues does not necessarily support systematic market failure, in 
particular, since only in very few cases, the football clubs were forced to leave the 
market (Vöpel 2011). In most of the cases, the losses are eventually covered by pri-
vate investors. Be it fans or wealthy individuals – as long as losses are covered without 
injecting taxpayer money, it is hard to see a serious problem from an economic point 
of view.15 In summary, the empirical picture is not as conclusive as it may appear at 
first sight. 
So, what about potential reasons for systematic market failure, in this case systematic 
overinvestment to an extend that endangers the existence of so many competing 
clubs that the league itself is in jeopardy. The literature offers quite a number of 
characteristics and mechanisms of commercial football markets that may cause over-
investment. Some theories serve to explain why single clubs fail to produce a viable 
investment strategy. For instance, management incompetence due to a preference 
for hiring former sports stars over business experts (Frick & Prinz 2006: 72-73), neg-
ative shocks due to unexpected failures of revenue sources (Szymanski 2012) or neg-
ative externalities from insolvent clubs on other clubs due to financial interrelations 
in consequence of mutual transfer transactions (Müller et al. 2012: 121-122) are dis-
cussed. While all of these explanations have their merits, they cannot explain system-
atic failure, i.e. inevitable deficiency of the league competition. Financial failures of 
14 The UEFA (2011) itself published a so-called benchmarking report stating that more than 50 per 
cent of the top 650 football clubs in Europe were producing losses, accumulating in 2011 to a sum 
of € 1700 million. 
15 There have been cases where taxpayer money has been used to save a famous football club from 
insolvency (for instance, the controversial 2001 Real Madrid case; Gröteke 2004). This represents a 
competitive concern – one that, however, falls under the state aid control policy. In December 2013, 
the European Commission started three new in-depth investigations into cases of public funding of 
several Spanish football clubs (with Real Madrid and Barcelona CF being among them) on the back-
ground of a possible violation of state aid rules (European Commission 2013). The questionable public 
support measures include tax privileges, state guarantees for bank loans, and real estate transactions 
at unusual conditions. 
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single competitors (in particular because of mismanagement) are a normal phenom-
enon and do not constitute market failure. 
Furthermore, the sports economics literature offers some theories that are more 
suited to explain systematic market failure. Firstly, systematic overinvestment may be 
caused by football clubs behaving as win maximizers instead of profit maximizers 
(inter alia, Késenne 1996, 2006; Vöpel 2011; Storm 2012). Models of league compe-
tition show that, in equilibrium, win maximizing teams invest more into talent than 
profit maximizing teams and, if the profit maximization equilibrium is defined as the 
paragon, in this sense win maximizing teams overinvest. Due to the special charac-
teristics of European football, win-maximizing behavior is generally accepted (empir-
ically and in theory) to better describe European football markets than profit-maxim-
izing behavior (which is generally viewed to be a good description of American pro-
fessional sports leagues). If no profits are extracted from the clubs (non-for-profit 
character, the goal of maximizing wins), then it is plausible that investment into 
sporting success is higher than in profit-oriented organizations. However, it is ques-
tionable whether this explanation suffices to explain non-viable overinvestment cre-
ating a systematic debt-accumulating and insolvency-producing market failure. Even 
if wins are maximized and, thus, higher investment levels are realized than in the 
profit maximizing equilibrium, this does not automatically imply that win maximiza-
tion is pursued unconditionally (in an irrational and irresponsible way). Rational win 
maximizers will attempt to maximize sporting success under the condition of finan-
cial viability. Not maximizing profits is hardly the same as unconditional overinvest-
ment until bankruptcy. In summary, win maximizing behavior alone does not explain 
systematic market failure; additional factors must be considered. 
3.2.2. A Rat Race? 
Secondly, several authors have characterized competition among football clubs as a 
deficient rat race and, thereby, emphasized the systematic character of the market 
failure (in particular Müller et al. 2012; also Vöpel 2011; Sass 2012).16 The funda-
mental idea of the rat race is that competitors compete for a fixed and indivisible 
reward. Since only the best competitor (the fastest rat) gets the reward (the cheese), 
the effort levels of all competitors increase without an increase of the output (which 
is fixed), thus reducing efficiency (Akerlof 1976: 603-606).17 Some authors empha-
size that competition among football clubs resembles such a rat race because of 
what they call (strict) positional competition: „there is only one champion and a 
team’s ranking can fall regardless of how well it plays in absolute terms. ‘Positional’ 
competition of this kind is similar to a ‘rat race’” (Vöpel 2011: 55). “Unlike most 
16 Franck (2013: 9) uses the term zombie race. 
17 Akerlof (1976) applies the rat race concept to a “surrealistic” (603) labor market where workers 
compete for a fixed wage by providing a fixed amount of output with different speeds. It is crucial 
for the model results that a higher speed of providing the output does not entail any benefits – oth-
erwise the induced race would not reduce efficiency! The aim of the paper is to provide examples 
where social structures and perceptions matter for the equilibrium outcome of a market (Akerlof 
1976: 617) – in the case of the rat race example the social structure is the workers’ “desire to have an 
equilibrium with all workers of the same class” (604; referring to classes of abilities). 
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common competitive processes, in a rat race additional input – despite being care-
fully considered within the framework of maximizing individual objectives – is not 
rewarded in overall terms. This is due to sport leagues exhibiting a remorseless rank-
ing arithmetic, as better positions in the table cannot be shared and clubs are strin-
gently banished to inferior ranks” (Müller et al. 2012: 121). This theory indeed pro-
vides a reasoning involving systematic market failure: if the aspiration levels of the 
teams do not match the available ranking positions (i.e. more than one teams wants 
to win the championship, etc.), the strict positional competition necessarily leads (i) 
to efforts exceeding the rewards (systematic overinvestment) and (ii) to an increasing 
mismatch between investment and reward in the course of time (systemic debt ac-
cumulation) as the teams stick to a risk-friendly gambling for success (Whitney 1993; 
Dietl & Franck 2007).  
However, the crucial question is whether the necessary conditions for a rat race are 
suitable assumptions for commercial football competition. The two conditions are: 
- a constant reward that cannot be increased by the absolute level of efforts 
(thus, it is a matter of allocation – who will get the reward – and not of 
growth) and 
- the increasing efforts are waste, i.e. they do not entail any benefit (other than 
the fixed reward).  
The first condition requires that the revenues of a football club strictly depend on 
the position it achieves in the final league ranking. Furthermore, a higher position in 
the ranking is strictly associated with a higher reward (revenue). Only relative effort 
(compared to the competitors) matters for the achieved revenue level and not abso-
lute efforts. These are the characteristics of the rat race-resembling strict positional 
competition. In order to discuss the accuracy of these characteristics for competition 
among football clubs, a look at the revenue sources (for instance, UEFA’s relevant 
revenues, see table 1) is helpful.  
- Gate revenues depend on stadium attendance figures, which are certainly re-
lated to sporting success but also depend on other factors like popularity of 
the club, attractiveness of the team (e.g. offensive play), (home) market size, 
advertising activities of the club, pricing strategies, etc. Thus, this revenue type 
does not strictly depend on the ranking position. It is well possible – and em-
pirically supported – that lower ranking clubs realize higher ticket revenues 
than higher ranking clubs. 
- Revenues from sponsorship and advertising also do not strictly depend on 
ranking positions. Sporting success certainly helps but other factors like nego-
tiation skills, popularity of the club, size of the local industry, etc., are of sig-
nificant relevance as well. Again, lower ranking clubs can – and do quite fre-
quently – enjoy higher revenues of this type than higher ranking clubs. 
- Revenues from broadcasting rights represent the revenue type where the strict 
relation of ranking position and revenue volume is best fulfilled – at least in 
systems of centralized marketing of broadcasting rights. In these systems (like 
in Germany, England or on the UEFA level), the league as whole collects the 
individual broadcasting rights from the teams, bundles them and sells them 
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out of one hand to the media. Then, the revenues are allocated among the 
league members according to a collectively agreed upon allocation mecha-
nism. Typically, this allocation mechanism provides money according to rank-
ing positions, so that teams’ rewards indeed strictly increase with their ranking 
position. Furthermore, the allocation mechanisms usually include considerable 
discontinuities, i.e. one position better is associated with an over-proportional 
increase in reward (e.g. winning the championship or qualifying for a Euro-
pean competition; in the negative sense, relegation implies an over-propor-
tional loss of revenues). In summary, this type of revenues indeed fits the con-
cept of strict positional competition – under the condition of centralized mar-
keting18. 
- Commercial activities’ revenues, again, do not depend strictly on ranking po-
sitions. 
- Other operating income and finance income do not depend strictly on ranking 
positions as well. 
Among all of UEFA’s relevant revenue sources merely one single revenue source, rev-
enues from collectively sold broadcasting rights, mirrors the necessary condition of 
a rat race-styled positional competition. Extending the discussion to monetary injec-
tions from benefactors and other “non-relevant” (according to FFP) sources further 
loosens the strict dependence of income on the reached position in the final league 
standings.19 Without any doubt, success helps to create higher revenues, however, 
this is a normal (and beneficial) element of economic competition. Decisively, the 
total reward is not fixed at all. Next to sporting success, there are various ways how 
clubs can increase their different types of revenues. Thus, the first condition for a rat 
race-deficiency is clearly not met. 
Note that the only revenue type that fits into the logic of positional competition only 
does so because UEFA (and some of the national football associations) designed the 
mechanism to allocate the money from the collectively sold broadcasting rights 
(which constitutes a cartel raising anticompetitive concerns20) in exactly such a way! 
In other words, the only element of systematic overinvestment incentives does not 
originate from market competition but is introduced against the market forces by 
the market-internal regulatory agency itself. From this perspective, ceteris paribus, 
overinvestment does not appear to be inherent to football competition – instead it 
appears to be inherent to other UEFA regulations. 
18 In systems of individual marketing of broadcasting rights, there is no strict relation between ranking 
position and revenues since other factors (popularity, attractiveness, size of the local market, fan base, 
etc.) come into play. 
19 In other words, by excluding these revenue types from the break even condition, UEFA’s FFP regu-
lations may actually strengthen the rat race elements instead of combating them. However, the effect 
would probably not be very relevant in its magnitude. 
20 See e.g. European Commission (2003), Massey (2007) and Budzinski (2012). 
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A brief look on the second condition for a deficient rat race-type of competition 
indicates that it is probably not met either. The increase in effort of all teams in-
creases the quality of talent and play and, thus, creates benefits for fans and players 
(salaries). In contrast to the reasoning of the rat race advocates, the increasing effort 
does not produce the same output (and thus reduce efficiency). Instead, it produces 
a higher quality output (Szymanski 2014: 5). In turn, this should increase the willing-
ness-to-pay of fans and (consequently) media which draws a connection to the 
“fixed” reward that, then, is not fixed in a dynamic notion. And, indeed, revenues 
from all types, but especially from broadcasting rights, have been growing consider-
ably in recent years. 
While the conditions of a systematically-deficient rat race are not given in football 
markets, there is some controversy whether the contest character of sports compe-
tition inherently entails incentives for irresponsible and unsustainable overinvest-
ment (pro: Dietl et al. 2008; Franck 2013; contra: Madden 2012; Peeters & Szymanski 
2012, 2014a, 2014b; Szymanski 2014).  
3.2.3. Systematic Bail-outs? 
Thirdly, there is a stream of the literature that views systematic market failure rooted 
in so-called soft budget constraints (Andreff 2007; Storm 2012; Storm & Nielsen 
2012; Franck 2013). The core idea is that there is a systematic bail-out for insolvent 
football clubs, so that their managers – in anticipation of the bail-out – systematically 
fail to consider the budget constraint when deciding on expenses. This represents a 
type of a moral hazard problem that is caused by a mismatch of decision competency 
and liability for the decision’s consequences. As a result, the soft budget constraint 
syndrome causes systematic and non-viable overinvestment. In analogy to the too-
big-to-fail phenomenon in ‘ordinary’ markets (and, in particular, in banks markets), 
it could be claimed that football clubs are too-prominent-to-fail (Budzinski & Müller 
2013) and can rely on being rescued. 
Notwithstanding the justified criticism that football markets do not resemble post-
socialist transformation markets (to which the soft budget constraint syndrome orig-
inally applied) to a sufficient degree to apply this theory (Szymanski 2014: 5), the 
underlying argument may still have some merit. A crucial issue is the identity of the 
bail-out providers. In order to classify bail-outs as systematic market failure, there 
must be some systematic (and not just incidental) bail-out activity. Franck (2013: 11-
19) names the state and private benefactors as supporting organizations providing 
the bail-outs. With respect to the injection of taxpayer money, Franck (2013: 12-14) 
refers to unpaid overdue taxes and social security contributions by Spanish football 
clubs as evidence. While he is absolutely right in his criticism of the lax enforcement 
practice of Spanish authorities and the resulting moral hazard problems, it is difficult 
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to see how this represents a market failure (and not a regulation failure) – in partic-
ular beyond the special case of Spain.21 Furthermore, it does not justify the break-
even rule of FFP in the sense of the inherence concept. The no overdue payables rule 
of FFP suffices to take care of this specific problem.  
A much more sophisticated problem is political-economic reasoning that local poli-
ticians experience incentives to support ‘their’ clubs in order to please voters or reap 
locational benefits of having a famous and successful football club (Franck 2013: 15-
17). If the existing state aid rules fail to deal with this problem (which would need 
to be analyzed first – and the European Commission is currently investigating the 
Spanish cases), this may present a justification for limiting the relevant income by 
excluding monetary or non-monetary injections financed by taxpayers. Still, the 
break-even rule goes significantly beyond doing this. 
And this relates to the second group viewed to be responsible for bail-outs – the 
private benefactors or sugar daddies (Lang et al. 2011; Franck & Lang 2012; Franck 
2013: 17-19). However, from a competition economics perspective, it is difficult to 
argue against voluntary equity injections by private investors. The individual decision 
where and when to place an investment represents a cornerstone of the efficiency 
advantages of market competition. If financial distress is the concern, then financial 
injections into equity – strengthening the financial fundament of the clubs in ques-
tion – actually alleviates the problem. Not surprisingly, Madden (2012) derives posi-
tive welfare effects of benefactors’ money injections in a theoretical model (see with 
different modeling also Peeters & Szymanski 2012, 2014a). From an economic point 
of view, it seems difficult to discriminate between (promoted) sponsorship money 
and (unwanted) equity money. In effect, both represent financial means provided by 
private actors because of expected utility increases worth the money. Discriminating 
between commercial and personal motives is difficult and often arbitrary, does not 
alter the effects – and becomes eventually blurry when considering the engagement 
of Red Bull buying into clubs like RB Salzburg (formerly Austria Salzburg) and 
R(asen)B(allsport) Leipzig (formerly SSV Markranstädt). 
In summary, the too-prominent-to-fail issue may represent a concern for the func-
tioning of competition among professional football clubs. However, more research 
is needed into how systematic this phenomenon is: are all clubs too prominent to 
fail? Or does it affect just specific ones? And is there really a problem beyond enforc-
ing state aid rules in order to discipline the use of taxpayer money? Altogether, from 
an economics perspective, there is little support for FFP – and, in particular, the dis-
criminatory investment restrictions of the break-even rule – being inherent to the 
objectives of rational, responsible and viable financial behavior. 
3.3. Proportionality: Are There Less Restrictive Alternatives? 
21 Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the European Commission has recently started an in-depth investiga-
tion in these cases, investigating whether European state aid rules got violated (European Commission 
2013; for an early economic analyses of the general problem see Gröteke 2004). 
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Even if – for the sake of the argument – inherence was accepted, the restrictive effects 
of the financial fair play rules would need to be proportional to the legitimate objec-
tives. Establishing proportionality would require two things. Firstly, the objectives 
must be important enough to justify the restrictive effects. If competition among 
football clubs without investment restrictions was necessarily causing irresponsible 
and non-viable financial behavior with an inherent market failure (which is doubtful, 
see section 3.2.), then the objectives of restoring rational, responsible and sustaina-
ble investment strategies may be important enough to justify the restrictive effects. 
Proportionality is certainly unproblematic in regard to the no overdue payables rule 
since the restrictive effects of this element of FFP are marginal if existing at all. The 
more difficult assessment relates to the break-even rule, discriminating between dif-
ferent types of revenues and monetary injections. Its effects of protecting incum-
bents, cementing the market structure and shifting rents from players to clubs (see 
section 2) are considerably restrictive so that justifying them in terms of proportion-
ality would require substantial objectives, for instance, relating to the fundamental 
functioning of the market. The weak link, however, remains the inconclusive empiri-
cal evidence for and the questionable theoretical reasoning of a systematic market 
failure (see section 3). 
Secondly, the restrictive effects can only be called proportional to the objectives if 
there does not exist any less restrictive alternative to achieve the same goals. In the 
context of FFP, this would ask for regulatory alternatives for combating overinvest-
ment without restrictive effects on players’ salaries, market access, competition in-
tensity and, at the end of the day, consumer welfare. According to Dietl et al. (2008) 
overinvestment becomes more probable if 
- the correlation between talent investment and winning probability tightens, 
- simultaneous investments dominate consecutive investments, 
- the league has an open structure with promotion and relegation (in contrast 
to an American-style closed league), and 
- revenue differentials both within a league and between hierarchical leagues 
increase. 
Note, however, that overinvestment here relates to the paragon of a profit-maximiz-
ing equilibrium and does not necessarily represent unsustainable and irresponsible 
(non-viable) overinvestment (and thus does not necessarily imply systematic market 
failure). Notwithstanding this qualification, the results reveal alternative avenues to 
limit overinvestment incentives. While the first three factors may be difficult to shape 
via regulation (or entail even more restrictive effects than FFP), the fourth factor – 
the magnitude of the revenue differentials – provides a particularly interesting start-
ing point from a competition economics perspective. The reason is that revenue dif-
ferentials within UEFA club competitions and between the UEFA leagues and the 
national leagues that result from the distribution of broadcasting rights revenues are 
by and large not the result of market processes in the current institutional framework 
of European football. Instead, these revenue differentials are defined and imple-
mented by UEFA (and the national football associations) as a part of its centralized 
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marketing strategy (the cartel for selling broadcasting rights). At the same time, rev-
enue differentials from the allocation of broadcasting revenues represent a signifi-
cant part of total revenue differentials. Moreover, it is exactly this type of revenue 
where a strict relation between ranking position and revenue volume applies (see 
section 3.2.2.). So, there is the interesting situation that one of the main factors 
setting incentives for overinvestment is rooted in UEFA’s regulation and policy itself. 
A change in the revenue sharing policy, thus, is likely to alleviate overinvestment 
incentives and provide an avenue to achieving the legitimate objectives without (ad-
ditional22) restrictive effects (Schokkaert 2013). Other potentially less restrictive in-
struments that were suggested in the literature include changes in the competition 
format, equal and non-discriminatory budget caps, reduction of compensation pack-
ages, transfer payment caps, and so-called luxury taxes (Lindholm 2010: 208-211; 
Schokkaert 2013).23 
However, the FFP regulations themselves may offer routes for less restrictive inter-
ventions achieving similar objectives. Perhaps, the no overdue payables rule alone 
would already suffice to achieve the legitimate objectives of FFP – without causing 
the restrictive effects of the break even rule. And even the break even rule can be 
changed in a way that most of the competition concerns would probably be resolved. 
The unlimited inclusion of equity-increasing injections as relevant income into the 
FFP scheme (see table 1 of section 2) might already suffice to alleviate the competi-
tion concerns to an extent that the remaining, less severe restrictive effects may qual-
ify to be proportional to legitimate objectives motivated by too-prominent-to-fail 
problems. 
In summary, it will be difficult to reason that the FFP regulations in its current shape 
are not excessive when compared to alternative instruments achieving the same le-
gitimate objectives. This criticism does not encounter all elements of FFP. The no 
overdue payables rule is likely to be completely unproblematic in competition terms. 
While the break even rule is much more crucial in this regard, it is particularly the – 
according to the economic analysis unnecessary – restrictive and selective character 
of the revenue sources that are relevant in UEFA’s diction that causes most of the 
concerns. 
4. Reflection and Conclusion 
22 The broadcasting rights cartel itself comes along with restrictive effects on competition. However, 
the European Commission (2003) cleared it under conditions and obligations (critical discussion: Mas-
sey 2007; Budzinski 2012). Since it exists anyway (as a consequence), it may solve the overinvestment 
problem as well without additional intervention.  
23 It would require a comparative economic analysis for each of these suggested instruments in order 
to determine whether they are indeed less restrictive. 
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Even if the FFP regulations fail to meet the conditions of inherence and proportion-
ality of its restrictive effects to the legitimate objectives, then there remains the pos-
sibility to accommodate them under the conditions of Article 101 (3) TFEU24. If FFP 
enhances allocative and dynamic efficiency, provides a fair share of these benefits to 
consumers and if the benefits are specific to the agreement and competition is not 
significantly impeded, then the European Commission may allow the agreement in 
total or under conditions and obligations. Whether FFP meets the conditions of Arti-
cle 101 (3) TFEU has been subject to analysis in the competition law literature with 
pessimistic conclusions about its suitability for such an antitrust exemption (Lindholm 
2010: 211; Long 2012: 96-100). This view is supported by the economic perspective 
in this paper, pointing to considerable anticompetitive effects for consumers and 
competition (violating the consumer benefits and no impediment of competition cri-
teria) as well as emphasizing the existence of less restrictive alternatives (violating 
the cartel specificity criterion). Furthermore, the questionable market failure reason-
ing (section 3) casts doubt upon the probability of efficiency-enhancing benefits of 
FFP (Szymanski 2014). 
Altogether, it appears to be doubtful that UEFA’s financial fair play regulations (in 
their current shape) stand in full compliance with European competition rules – at 
least from an economic perspective. Against this background, it appears to be a bit 
surprising that EU Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia publicly sided with 
UEFA president Michel Platini in praising the FFP initiative (Almunia 2012; Almunia & 
Platini 2012). However, at a closer look, the statements explicitly merely mention 
FFP’s compliance with state aid law (Long 2012: 84-86). The concerns, however, ad-
dress the laws against private restraints of competition (anti-cartel rules and abuse 
control). Given the complaint and the court proceeding initiated by player agent 
Daniel Striani, the Commission is forced to take a closer look at the competition law 
compliance of FFP and it will be interesting to see the outcome. From the perspective 
taken in this paper, a modification of FFP broadening the relevant income concept 
of FFP’s break even rule represents sort of a minimum requirement for alleviating the 
most important anticompetitive concerns (incumbent protection effect and consoli-
dation effect; partly also salary reduction effect). A commitment along these lines 
then may be enough to appease a Commission that does appear to be taking a sym-
pathetic stance towards the fundamental ideas of FFP.25 Whether such a minimum 
modification of FFP would represent an optimal outcome from a competition eco-
nomics perspective is more difficult to say and in particular depends on the compar-
ative assessment of alternatives like (i) reliance on the FFP element no overdue paya-
bles rule alone in order to combat imminent insolvency risks, (ii) modifying the allo-
cation mechanism of broadcasting rights revenues in order to reduce revenue differ-
entials (and thus overinvestment incentives), or (iii) the implementation of other in-
struments (luxury tax, non-discriminatory budget cap, etc.). 
24 This requires to classify FFP as an agreement among undertakings and/or associations of undertak-
ings. See for a discussion Budzinski and Szymanski (2014). 
25 Furthermore, the Commission has recently put focus on reaching mutual agreements with the par-
ties to a case instead of more unilaterally enforcing competition rules (Budzinski & Kuchinke 2012). 
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